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A recent review of the new book by revisionist
historian William Appleman Williams, Empire as a Way of
Lifel asserts in criticism, "Let us face it, every
great nation became great because of its conquests,
often at the expense of other peoples. This fact must
be recognized, but it does not amount to an enduring
trait of national character.t 2 That reviewer thus draws
clearly the battle lines on this highly controversial
book, as on Williams' previous work as well. On one
side are those who do not try to conceal what Williams
would call imperial arrogance--the identification of
greatness with conquest, the association between civili-
zation and conqueror, and the inevitability of these
pairings C"this fact must be recognized"). To them,
empire is a small part of America's past, and Williams'
discursive, homely, and sometimes even unscholarly
style does not encourage them to reassess. On the other
side are those like Williams who see empire as the funda-
mental and defining concern of American statesmen since
the early eighteenth century.
Williams' argument is important, and it is all-en-
compassing. That the reviewer cited above found it
necessary to write a vitriolic and ad hominem attack on
the book suggests the extent of the emotion that Williams'
argument arouses and of the criticism that the book will
elicit. Thus, whatever side one chooses, it is essen-
tial to analyze separately the argument Williams presents,
the reasons for the criticism, and the wider implications
of the message he wants to communicate.
t Assistant Professor of Political Science, Williams College;
B.A., University of Minnesota, 1966; Ph.D., Princeton University,
l75.
1. W.A. Williams, Empire as a Way of Life (1980) [hereinafter
cited by page number only].
2. Lukacs, Book Review, The New Republic, Oct, 11, 1980, at
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The story begins in England in the sixteenth cen-
tury, with the knighting of a pirate--Drake--by Elizabeth
I. It continues with Cromwell and Locke, to the shores
of the New World and the merciless destruction of gener-
ous hosts, the First Americans. Whether with guns,
disease, or trade for profit, Africans and successive
settlements of Native Americans became victims. A list
of interventions on foreign territory, excluding declared
wars, accompanies most chapters; a small sample of the
long list illustrates Williams' point. 1787-1829: The
Dominican Republic, C"From the halls of Montezuma to the
shores of Tripoli") Mexico, West and East Florida, the
Marquesas Islands, the Caribbean, Algiers, Oregon,
Africa, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Greece. 1829-1898: The
Falkland Islands, Sumatra, Argentina, Peru, the Fiji
Islands, Samoa, Drummond Island, Smyrna, Turkey, Joahanna
Island, Nicaragua, Japan, Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, China,
Uruguay, Panama, Paraguay, Angola, Colombia, Formosa, the
Hawaiian Islands, Korea, Egypt, Haiti, the Bering Sea,
Chile, Brazil. 1898-1920: the Philippine Islands, Honduras,
Syria. 1920-1941: Siberia, Guatemala, Soviet Russia, Costa
Rica, Newfoundland, Bermuda, St. Lucia, Bahamas, Jamaica,
Antigua, Trinidad, British Guiana, Greenland, Dutch Guiana,
Iceland, Germany.
Williams, however, is not interested in the details
of those interventions, and his argument requires that
they merely be mentioned. His attention is rather on the
attitudes that led to such interventions, and he aims to
leave the impression that the imperial mind and its impe-
rial policies are the core around which American domestic
and foreign policy has been built since the very beginning.
Long before Karl Marx or V. I. Lenin, the early Americans
saw economic growth as synonymous with empire. That ex-
pansion served both state and economy. Economic growth
required commerce and trade. "Riches," Williams quotes
John Locke as saying, "do not consist in having more Gold
and Silver, but in having more in proportion than the
rest of the World, or than our Neighbours."'3
Not only prosperity but freedom was at stake. The
"imperial republicanism" of Samuel and John Adams, of
Madison, and of Jefferson suggests a revision in the
philosophy of early liberalism. In American hands, the
source of freedom and stability would not be found in a
strong authority or in pluralism, but in empire. Thus
James Madison, in 1787, writes to Thomas Jefferson, "This




its purposes, must operate not within a small but an
extensive sphere."4 Jefferson concurs, and in his
second inaugural address claims, "[Tlhe larger our
association the less it will be shaken by local passions."
5
Furthermore, should the imperial strategy be doubted, one
need only be reminded of the duties of civilizing powers.
Racism, though an essential ingredient of "empire as a
way of life," was not the cause but the justification--a
psychological gloss on the harsh reality of empire.
Winthrop's "City upon a Hill," 6 assisted by missionaries
and marines, would be the hope, as John Adams put it, of
the "slavish part of mankind."7
By the twentieth century this trinity of stable
freedom, prosperity, and racism had taken on a new look
but not a new content: the Big Stick (Roosevelt), Dollar
Diplomacy (Taft), and Saving the World (Wilson). In
every case the original argument worked: through empire
we could have both guns and butter, we could "have our
cake and eat it, too," we had grown "accustomed to winning
without paying any significant costs." 8 And always, as
Williams, quoting Carl Becker, observes, "people who open
and settle the frontiers, 'must be always transforming the
world into their ideal of it."'
9
The imperial mind always prevailed, but it did have
its critics; and Williams' list of heroes and villains
may strike a raw nerve in many who otherwise would be un-
disturbed by the argument itself. The villains are many,
from Benjamin Franklin, Sam Adams, Madison, Jefferson,
and Jackson to F.D.R., Truman, Acheson, Kennedy, and
Kissinger. The tragic characters are Lincoln, who struck
a Faustian bargain--to fight the evil of slavery with the
evil of empire; and Lyndon Johnson, who tried to resolve
the contradiction of American history- -"empire as a way
... of avoiding the fundamental challenge of creating a
humane and equitable community or culture"1 0 --by pursuing
both imperalism abroad and equity at home. Indeed, John-
son's tragedy is a product of Lincoln's sin: "Lincoln
won the Civil War, but his Faustian bargain left us with
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with northerners who were being tough and successful."I I
Finally, the heroes are Hoover and Eisenhower. Their
defeats, writes Williams, "led many observers ... to con-
clude that those men were naive, misguided, or simply
mistaken; and on those grounds to dismiss them as irrele-
vant, even to charge them with responsibility for Ameri-
ca's subsequent troubles."'12 How then, one wonders, did
Carter, a Navy man and a Southerner, fall victim to these
charges? Williams' account of developments in the mean-
time--the farmers' role, the deliberate creation of
dependencies such as Canada, disarmament, the shift to
oil, the New Deal, National Security Council Document
No. 68,13 Korea, and Cuba--relates a pattern that con-
tinues and leads him in conclusion to ask: Does democracy
need empire?
Moved by the frightening dangers that this question
has come to imply in a nuclear age and no doubt impatient
with the unwillingness of the majority to listen to those
who answer "no," Williams has responded with a simultane-
ously powerful and petulant book. The difficulty is that
it can be read either way, as powerful or as petulant.
The audience he does not need to reach will read it as
powerful, persuasive, engrossing, and horrifying. They
will find themselves confirmed. The audience he needs to
reach will focus on its vulnerabilities: the insipid and
-pedantic introduction, the missing references, the sloppy
editing, the deliberately anti-scholarly and occasionally
personalizing style. This second, resistant audience can
easily find reasons not to listen. One can only speculate
on why Williams chose this style. Is it the proverbial
cowardice of the American radical who succumbs to exaspera-
tion where a more committed revolutionary would persist?
Is it the publishing industry looking for a quick buck
that goads distinguished "names" into exposing their
agonies in print for a mass market?14 Is it the hidden
conservatism, even puritanism, of American intellectuals
that makes them squirm at an historian's outburst of
justifiable passion when "speaking his mind"?
11. P. 183. C. Vann Woodward makes a similar assessment in
his review of Merle Miller's Lyndon: An Oral Biography. See C.V.
Woodward, Book Review, The New Republic, Nov. 1, 1980, at 29-31.
12. P. 145.
13. See pp. 187-91.
14. One thinks of Robert Dahl's After the Rev.olution? (1970)
in the same way.
[VOL. 6490
DIMENSIONS OF HEGEMONY
To focus on the failings of Williams' style, how-
ever, is not necessarily to destroy his thesis. Indeed,
he is not alone in his argument. For example, his
attempt to draw attention to the intellectual origins of
empire reminds one of A. 0. Hirschman's The Passions and
the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before
Its Triumph1 5 and of Edmund S. Morgan's American Slavery,
American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia.
1 6
The closer one gets to the present, the longer becomes
the list of historians with like-minded treatises. Why,
then, will the book be so criticized? Partly, it is the
frontal attack. As Williams' opening lines warn, "The
words empire and imperialism enjoy no easy hospitality
in the minds and hearts of most contemporary Americans.",1 7
For example, it is easy to talk about a persistent race
"problem" in the United States; it is another thing to
call ourselves racists. Partly, it is a challenge to
those liberals who tended to see the demoralization after
the Vietnam defeat, the consequences of feelings of
collective guilt after a long age of innocence, as more
dangerous than the causes of the war itself. Williams
seems to be stirring up trouble to those who value
stability. And partly, it may even be that we need to
see the victims as scapegoats--OPEC, immigrants, Third
World barbarians--to withstand a recession that shows no
early signs of relief. Thus, although it is easy to un-
derstand why Williams' book will elicit a critical and
often unsympathetic response, this criticism should not
blind us to the wider implications of Williams' arguments.
At a time when racist and anti-semitic movements on the
right are enjoying a renaissance, when social legislation
to aid the victims of internal imperialism is being
reduced, when promises of rearmament and jingoism win an
election and once again threaten victims of the external
empire, when the program of the new First Lady is to re-
construct Washington as a "shining white City on the Hill,"
surely we do ourselves a disservice in dismissing Williams
out of hand.
At the very least, Williams provides an interpreta-
tion, historically grounded, for a number of contemporary
problems. For example, difficulties in relations between
the United States and its European allies may well stem
from the American attitude that Williams describes. This
15. A. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests (1977).
16. E. Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom (1975).
17. P. viii.
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attitude was poignantly obvious in the simultaneous proc-
lamation in 1823 of the Monroe Doctrine and of the right
"to support Greek revolutionaries,"'18 but it is a posi-
tion that hardly suits present circumstances. As Andrew
Shonfield warned an American audience, former Secretary
of State Kissinger's complaint that the European Commun-
ity presents the United States with faits accomplis
rather than opportunities for prior consultation had a
remedy that was a "severe dilemma for the United States."1 9
He continued:
What is being asked, quite justifiably, of the
European Community is in effect that it should
concede to its main ally the right to be in-
volved in its decision-making at the pre-legis-
lative stage. For its external policies are,
as is natural, connected often in intimate ways
with all manner of bargains struck and arguments
conducted on subjects of domestic interest. It
is not possible for an outsider to be involved
in one and excluded from the other. The question
would then arise whether the United States would
be prepared to grant the representatives of the
European Community a reciprocal right of pre-
legislative consultation on Congressional
business which they believed might in some way
affect them.... [I]t is by no means impossible
that the Europeans ... would be prepared to
extend what I call the "Community method" of
conducting politics to Transatlantic relations.
This means above all the right of mutual inter-
vention in one another's domestic affairs. The
European nations have shown since the war that
they are ready to abate their notions of sover-
eign dignity sufficiently to accommodate the
new mode of conducting international relations.
The United States by contrast has not yet en-
countered the pressures that have led others to
accept the radical adaptation of national insti-
tutions required for that end.
2 0
A second example that Williams helps clarify is the
persistent inability of the United States to provide a
18. P. 73.
19. A. Shonfield, Europe: Journey to an Unknown Destination
6 (1974).
20. Id. at 6-7.
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level of general welfare commensurate with its great
wealth. Explanations that point to the size of the de-
fense budget, to the dominance by business and the
reliance on private, market solutions, and to the socio-
economic status of elected officials at all levels seem
adequate; but these are different aspects of the same
problem. Governmental policy, or lack thereof, responds
to the definition of conflicts within a society; a strong
socialist movement, for example, succeeds in making class
issues--income redistribution, transfer payments, health
care, housing--important because it divides the elector-
ate by a class cleavage. In the United States, time and
again, elections are won by creating a conflict between
the American population and the rest of the world, not by
dividing them internally. As Williams puts it, "One of
the major characteristics of an imperial way of life is
its tendency to define domestic problems and difficulties,
and to explain the failure to resolve them, in terms of
external developments. ''2 1 From Williams' perspective, it
is not surprising that Philip Converse continued to find
a major inconsistency in the American public's attitudes
on domestic policy and those on foreign policy,2 2 nor is
it surprising that Americans say they have no choice be-
tween presidential candidates. There is, however, a
tragedy in the consequences.
At the very most, Williams may point in the direc-
tion of solutions, to the endangered world order as well
as to domestic injustices. The first step is to recognize
the cause. If we learn to recognize not only that our
prosperity is the basis of our democracy 2 3 but also that
the empire is the basis of our prosperity, we might be
less cavalier in our management of the international mone-
tary order 2 4 or in our flirtation with tariffs. We might
even see that taking an active part in restructuring the
international economic order in a more equitable direction
would give us some control over the consequences, control
that would not be possible with the collapse of the inter-
national monetary system. If we learn to recognize our
21. P. 149.
22. See Converse, The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,
in Ideology and Discontent 206 (D. Apter ed. 1964); Converse, Atti-
tudes and Non-Attitudes: Continuation of a Dialogue, in The Quantita-
tive Analysis of Social Problems (E. Tufte ed. 1970). But see Nie,
Mass Belief Systems Revisited: Political Change and Attitude Struc-
ture, 36 J. Pol. 540 (1974) (arguing that earlier survey findings
reflected transient phenomena not intrinsic to the nature of mass publics).
23. As David Potter showed so well in People of Plentl C1954).
24. See Abdalla, The Inadequacy and Loss of Legitimacy of the
International Monetary Fund. [1980:2] Development Dialogue 25.
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imperial history, we might be more receptive to Third
World perspectives and thus regain influence we have
abdicated to a Soviet Union that is receptive. If we
learn to recognize the lesson of Britain--the prolonged
damage to one's domestic economy that results from an
insistence on maintaining one's world power status at
all costs 2 5 and the ultimately destabilizing conse-
quences of "internal colonialism",2 6--we might again
have control over events before it is too late. As
Williams says, perhaps not too melodramatically, "Assume
the worst. Empire as a way of life will lead to nuclear
death. Community as a way of life will lead for a time
to less than is necessary. Some of us will die. But
how one dies is terribly important. It speaks to the
truth of how we have lived."2 7
The second step would be to take action. As
Williams poses it, we must ask ourselves the question,
"Is the idea and reality of America possible without
empire?"'28 Perhaps we can return to where the story
began, with Elizabeth I; that is to say, this time to
the colonization of Ireland with Protestants. The at-
tempt to find some peaceful solution to that terrible
conflict founders today, Brian Barry shows, 2 9 on the un-
willingness of the Protestants to compromise. Though in
control in Northern Ireland, they perceive themselves to
be a beleaguered minority within the island's population.
They act defensively, therefore, at the same time that
they are in control. They are in control because they
managed to define the political cleavage in Northern
Ireland (through a change in the electoral law in 1929)
as a communal conflict: as Barry describes it, "Every
general election would thus be simply a plebiscite on the
issue of the Border: there would be no way in which a
voter could simultaneously vote for or against partition
and for or against alternative socio-economic policies
that might cut across the Protestant-Catholic division. '" 3 0
The only solution to the current conflict, according to
25. See Blank, Britain: The Politics of Foreign Economic
Policy, the Domestic Economy, and the Problem of Pluralistic Stag-
nation, in Between Power and Plenty (P. Katzenstein ed. 1978).
26. M. Hechter, Internal Colonialism (1975).
27. P. 213.
28. P. 211.
29. Barry, The Consociational Model and Its Dangers, 3 Euro-
pean J. Political Research 393-412 (1975).




... a recognition by both sides that some
sort of accommodation has to be reached so
as to avoid an indefinite continuation
(probably of steadily increasing intensity)
in the present communal violence and the
disruption of ordinary life, this could be
done without any special political arrange-
ments simply by the Protestant majority
making conciliatory moves and the Catholic
minority responding. Unfortunately, how-
ever, many Protestants probably believe
that total victory can be achieved at an
acceptable cost. So long as they continue
to believe this (and it is not obviously
an irrational belief) there can be no very
bright prospect of accommodation in Northern
Ireland.31
If Williams is right, the United States has for a
very long time been the "Protestants" in the world; and
until we believe that we must make the conciliatory moves,
there is no more hope for justice or order in that con-
text than there is in Northern Ireland.
31. Id. at 411.
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